Home IP Core Fault-Injection Countermeasures
PHYSICAL ATTACK COUNTERMEASURES

Fault Injection + Power Side-Channel Resistance

FIPS 140-3 Level 3 requires physical attack countermeasures beyond logical security. The zeroRISC IP core implements redundant logic paths, glitch detectors, alert architecture, and masked cryptographic operations to resist EMFI, laser fault injection, voltage glitching, and differential power analysis.

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THREAT MODEL

Physical attack vectors and assurance levels

Attack VectorDescriptionCountermeasureStatus
EMFI Electromagnetic fault injection — localized EM pulse disrupts logic state Redundant execution paths + majority voter; alert on divergence MITIGATED
Laser FI Focused laser beam flips individual SRAM cells or logic gates Metal shield layer in PDK; sensor mesh with tamper response MITIGATED
Voltage Glitch Supply voltage transient causes skipped instructions or corrupted ALU results On-chip voltage glitch detector; clamp + alert on rail deviation MITIGATED
Clock Glitch Short clock pulse causes setup-time violations in sequential logic Clock glitch detector circuit; redundant clock domain sampling MITIGATED
DPA / SPA Differential/simple power analysis correlates switching activity with key bits First-order masking for AES and HMAC; randomized stall insertion in pipeline MITIGATED
Timing Attack Variable execution time leaks secret-dependent branching or memory access patterns Constant-time cryptographic operations; no secret-dependent branches MITIGATED
Microprobing Physical access to internal buses via FIB/microprobe Metal bus encryption; active shield mesh; wire bonding on top metal PARTIAL*

* Microprobing resistance depends on packaging choices made by the OEM. zeroRISC provides bus encryption; physical package security (potting, active enclosure) is OEM scope.

COUNTERMEASURE DETAILS

Implementation of physical attack countermeasures

Redundant Logic Paths

Critical security decisions (lifecycle checks, key operations, AES S-box) execute on two or three redundant logic paths with a majority voter. A divergence between paths triggers the alert handler.

Alert Architecture

Centralized alert handler receives signals from glitch detectors, sensor mesh, redundancy voters, and parity checkers. Configurable response: key wipe, lifecycle lock-to-RMA, or CPU reset.

Masking (AES / HMAC)

First-order boolean masking applied to AES S-box and HMAC compression function. Random share refreshing seeded from CSRNG every n operations (configurable).

PRNG Pipeline Stalls

CSRNG-seeded random stall insertion in the cryptographic pipeline reduces DPA correlation by randomizing the timing of power consumption peaks across many traces.

Glitch Detectors

Dedicated voltage and clock glitch detector circuits monitor VDD and CLK rail quality. Configured thresholds trigger alert within 2 clock cycles of a detected anomaly.

Sensor Mesh

Active tamper detection mesh layered over the RoT die area detects physical probing or die opening. Breach triggers immediate key wipe via OTP destruction command.

Request the fault-injection countermeasure datasheet

Detailed countermeasure specification with test methodology and FIPS 140-3 Level 3 design evidence package. Note: zeroRISC provides the IP-level countermeasures; package-level physical security (potting, active enclosure) is OEM scope and is not replaced by this IP block.